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RULEMAKING AND ADJUDICATION UNDER THE
FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
The rise of administrative bodies has been the most significant legal
trend of the last century and perhaps more values today are affected by
their decisions than by those of all the courts, review of administrative
decisions apart.'
Administrative agencies are a unique combination of legislative, executive,
and judicial powers, which by their very nature conflict wth the concept of
separation of powers - the cornerstone of our constitutional structure of government. 2 An administrative agency promulgates rules with its legislative
power, secures due enforcement of rules through its executive power, and
interprets and applies rules in the exercise of its judicial power. In practice,
apart from the niceties of constitutional theories, administrative agencies
1. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952).
2. K. DAvis, ADMimsmtRATIVE LAw TExT 24 (3d ed. 1972).
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constitute a fourth branch of government not defined in the United States
Constitution.3
The struggle to control the discretion necessarily afforded burgeoning administrative agencies is the history of administrative law. The Florida Administrative Procedure Act (APA), enacted in 1961, constituted an attempt to impose greater uniformity upon the divergent procedural processes then employed by various agencies." Partially premised on the Model Act of the American Law Institute, 5 the APA appeared to be a major step toward implementing the procedural due process guarantees of the state 6 and federal7 constitutions. Judicial construction, however, aborted portions of the APA and
agencies abused their authority by circumventing the act's strictures. 8 Effective
January 1, 1975, Florida has a new APA designed to insure the protection of
due process by remedying deficiencies and closing loopholes that existed under
the old act, and by introducing important new procedures. The purpose of
this note is to contrast and compare the two acts in the areas of rulemaking
and adjudication, and to analyze and evaluate the major changes that the act
will effect in Florida administrative procedure.
DEFINrIONS

Under the former APA, the term "agency" was defined in both the rulemaking portion of the act 9 and the part covering adjudication procedure.1°
Although the definitions were essentially the same, different governmental
bodies were exempted from the definitions.1 Further, the extent to which

3. Id. at 24-25.
4. Each agency's procedures were governed by the statutes governing that agency. Some
statutes spelled out procedure in detail but others were essentially silent on the matter. The
result was a substantial divergence in due process guarantees. Compare FLA. STAT. §509.032
(1957) (conferring upon the Hotel and Restaurant Commission the general power to make
any rules and regulations necessary to carry out its duties) with FLA. STAT. §401.04 (1961)
(conferring upon the Milk Commission specific powers to hold hearings, receive sworn testimony, et cetera) [and] FLA. STAT. §520.04 (1959) (requiring an administrative hearing before
denial, suspension, or revocation of a retail automobile dealer's license) [andc FLA. STAT.
§495.101 (1957) (silent as to whether an administrative hearing is necessary upon cancellation of a trademark).
5. ALI MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT (1946) [hereinafter cited as MSAPA].
6.

FLA. CONsr. Decl. of Rights §9 (1968).

7. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
8. St. Petersburg (Fla.) Times, Dec. 9, 1973, §B at 16, col. 4.
9. Former Fla. Stat. §120.021(1) (1961) gave the following definition of "agency" for
purposes of agency rulemaking: "Agency means any state, board, commission, department, or
officer authorized by law to make rules, except the legislative and judicial departments of
government, the military and the Governor."
10. Former Fla. Stat. §120.(1) (1961) defined "agency" as follows: "Agency means the
governing body of any state board, commission, or department, or state officer who constitutes
the agency authorized by law to adjudicate any party's legal rights, duties, privileges or immunities, except the legislature, courts, governor and the department of revenue."
11. Compare former Fla. Stat. §120.21(l) (1961), with former Fla. Stat. §120.021(1) (1961).
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agencies of local government were covered by the APA was left unclear. 12 As
a result, the definitions were judicially expanded so that county school boards
were brought under the act.' 3 These decisions strongly indicated that other
county agencies were also covered. 4 On the other hand, court decisions implied that municipal governmental agencies were not within the purview of
the APA unless another statute incorporated the act by specific .refereaice go as
to bring the designated municipal function within the coverage of the APA.15In an effort to provide greater uniformity. the'new APA provides -a single
definition for "agency."' 6 Under the new act the term includes the Governor
and all other state officers, departments and departmental units, commissions,
regional planning agencies, boards, districts, and authorities. Further, it indudes counties and municipalities only to the extent they are expressly made
subject to the APA by general or special law or existing judicial decision. Because existing judicial decisions have held certain- county agencies, but not
municipalities or other local agencies, subject to the act, these holdings apparently remain controlling.'7
Another major problem under the old act was the definitions of "rule"' s
and "order." 19 The broad definition of "rule" was limited by qualifying
12. See, e.g., Board of Pub. Instruction v. State ex rel. Allen, 219 So. 2d "40 (Fla. 1969);
Arvida Corp. v. City of Sarasota, 213 So. 2d 756 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
13. Board of Pub. Instruction v. State ex rel. Allen, 219 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 1969) (definition
of agency in APA does not preclude the act from applying to county board of education);
Canney v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 222 So. 2d 803 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
14. E.g., Board of Pub. Instruction v. State ex rel. Allen, 219 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1969),
asserted that because a county school board is a part of the state system of public education
and had been held to be a state agency for the purpose of immunity from suit, it is also a
state agency within the purview of the APA. Accord, Adams v. Board of Pub., Instruction,
229 So. 2d 423 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1969); Canney v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 222 So. 2d 803
(Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
15. ,Arvida Corp. v. City of Sarasota, 218 So. 2d 756 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1968) (hearings required to be conducted by municipalities under the 1967 Bulkhead Act were held to be
governed by the APA solely because the Bulkhead Act specifically incorporated the APA by
reference).
16. FLA. STAT. §120.52(l) (Supp. 1974) defines "agency" as follows: "(a) The Governor
in the exercise of all executive powvers other than those derived from the Constitution. (b)
Each other state officer and each state department, departmental unit described in §20.04,
commission, regional planning agency, board, district, and authority, including, but not
limited to, those described in chapters 160, 163, 298, 373, 380 and 582. (c) Each other unit of
government in the state, including counties and municipalities to the extent they are expressly made subject to this act by general or special law or existing judicial decisions."
17. See Board of Pub. Instruction v. State ex rel. Allen, 219 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 1969);
Arvida Corp. v. City of Sarasota, 213 So. 2d 756 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
18. Former Fla. Stat. §120.021(2) (1961) defined "rule" as follows: "[O]rder, regulation,
standard, -statement of policy, requirement; procedure, or interpretation of general application, including the amendment or repeal thereof, adopted by an agency to implement,,
interpret, or make specific the law enforced or administered by it, or to govern its orgafization or procedure affecting the rights, duties, privileges or immunities of, or procedures'
available to the public or interested parties.
19. Former Fla. Stat. §120.21(3) (1951). defined "order" as follows: "Order means the
whole or any part of the final decision (whether affirmative, negative, injucdve, or declaratory in form) of any agency in any. matter other than: rule making but including licensiiig.";
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language in the statute itself 20 and was further limited by administrative
practice.21 Similarly, the broad definition of "order," which is essentially the
result of adjudication, was restricted in application to only those agencies that
"adjudicate any party's legal rights, duties, privileges or immunities." 22 By
combining the narrowly construed definitions of "rule" and "order" with cases
decided before the adoption of the APA, 23 the courts developed the theory that
some types of agency action were neither quasi-legislative nor quasi-judicial,
but quasi-executive and therefore not covered by the APA.2 4 The effect of the

characterization of agency action as quasi-executive resulted in unreviewable
agency action 25 and, more importantly for the purposes of this note, denied
2
certain persons the right to an administrative hearing. 6
In an attempt to close the quasi-executive loophole, the new APA makes
several changes. Although the definitions of "rule" and "order" have not been
substantially altered, a definition of "agency action" has been added.27 The
purpose of this definition is to bring all agency functions under the act without
the need of classification. Further, a hearing is required in all rulemaking pro-

20. Former Fla. Stat. §120.021(2) (1961) provided in pertinent part: "[B]ut rule shall not
include matter concerning only the internal management of the agency .... "
21. See, e.g., Op. Arr'Y GEN. FLA. 070-161 (1970) (stating that a letter from the comptroller to all assessors is not a "rule" within the meaning of the APA). See also Polar Ice
Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 146 So. 2d 609 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
22. See, e.g., Jezak v. Vordemaier, 227 So. 2d 69, 72 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
23. See, e.g., De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1957); West Flagler Amusement
Co. v. State Racing Comm'n, 122 Fla. 222, 165 So. 64 (Fla. 1935); Bloomfield v. Mayo, 119
So. 2d 417 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
24. See, e.g., Bay Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 229 So. 2d 302 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1969); Meiklejohn v. American Distribs., Inc., 210 So. 2d 259 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
25. Bay Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 229 So. 2d 302 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1969), is the leading
case in this area. Bay National Bank sought to challenge, by declaratory judgment, the
grant of a bank charter to a competitor, insisting that the APA required a public hearing
prior to any such grant by the banking commissioner, Dickinson. Plaintiff relied on §120.22
of the 1961 act, which stated in part: "Any party's legal rights, duties, privileges or imThe circuit
munities shall be determined only upon public hearing by an agency .......
court dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. The first district court affirmed, holding that the banking commissioner was not required to hold a public hearing prior to the
contested issuance of a charter. The court held: "In passing upon such an application the
Commissioner performs a purely . . . quasi-executive function." Therefore, since the "part
of the Act which includes the provisions guaranteeing a public hearing . . . pertains solely
to . . . agencies in the performance of a quasi-judicial function," a hearing is not required under the APA. By determining that this type of agency action was not within the
coverage of the APA, the court effectively precluded review of agency action under the APA.
The court concluded that the proper method of review was by suit for injunction as provided in the banking code.
26. See text accompanying note 22 supra. See also Washington Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Dickinson, 282 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1973); National Distrib. Co. v. Huber Distrib. Co., 283 So. 2d
122 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
27. FLA. STAT. §120.52(2) (Supp. 1974) defines "agency action" as: "Agency action means
the whole or part of a rule or order, or the equivalent, or the denial of a petition to adopt
a rule or issue an order. The term also includes any request made under [§120.54(4)]."
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ceedings where requested, 28 and a hearing, either formal

or informal,

0

is

required in all other proceedings in which the "substantial interests" of a party
are determined by an agency. By using the substantial interests standard as a
guideline for coverage, the new statute eliminates the necessity of finding an
exact legal right, duty, or immunity. Licensing, the situation in which the
quasi-executive loophole was most often found to exist, is also brought more
definitively within the coverage of the act.31 Although the APA implies that
action upon an initial application for a license does not require a hearing,
denial of a permit entitles any persons whose substantial interests have been
32
affected by such denial to a hearing.
RULEMAKING

FUNcTIONS

Rulemaking under the 1961 APA was generally a matter of agency prerogative. Providing only for the publication of rules, the act did not prescribe uniform procedures to be followed by the agency in carrying out its
rulemaking functions.33 As a result, although under certain circumstances
notice of proposed rules was given to certain individuals or associations, rules

were frequently promulgated without participation by the public or by parties
affected. 34 Additionally, procedures for the adoption of rules varied among
agencies, 35 and the statute's publication requirements failed to provide sufficient notice to the general public.36 As a result of such deficiencies, the new
APA is designed to insure greater public participation and fairness in agency
rulemaking through new uniform procedures, including changed notice and
publication requirements. 37 Further, the new act provides for a check on

28. FLA. STAT. §120.54(2) (Supp. 1974) provides: "If the intended action concerns any
rule other than one relating exclusively to organization, procedure or practice, the agency
shall, on the request of any affected person received within fourteen days after the date of
publication of the notice, give affected persons an opportunity to present evidence and argument on all issues under consideration appropriate to inform it of their contentions."
29. FLA. STAT. §120.57(1) (Supp. 1974).
30. FLA. STAT. §120.57(2) (Supp. 1974).
31. FLA. STAT. §120.60(1) (Supp. 1974) provides: "Unless otherwise provided by statute
enacted subsequent to the effective date of this act, licensing is subject to the provisions of
§120.57."
32. FLA. STAT. §120.60(2) (Supp. 1974) provides in pertinent part: "On denial of a
license application on which there has been no hearing, the denying agency shall inform the
applicant of any right to a hearing pursuant to §120.57."
33. Former Fla. Stat. §§120.031-.051 (1961).
84. See, e.g., Daniel v. State Turnpike Authority, 213 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1968), appeal after
remand, 237 So. 2d 222 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1970) (holding that failure of turnpike authority to
provide for notice and hearing, prior to its adoption of a resolution, did not amount to a
denial of due process).
35. FLORIDA LAW REvIsIoN CoMMIssIoN's PRoPosED ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Aar, REPr
's
PORTER'S COMMENT (Jan. 10, 1974) (Reporter, A. England) [hereinafter cited as REPo

The Law Revision Commission's draft was not passed by the Florida Legislature
and differs considerably from the APA that was enacted and that is the subject of this note.
36. See former Fla. Stat. §120.041(4) (1961) for notice provisions.
37. FLA. STAT. §§120.53-.55 (Supp. 1974) cover rulemaking under the new APA.
COMMEN.
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arbitrary agency action by creating a standing committee in the state legisla8
ture to oversee agency rulemaking.3
Filingand Taking Effect of Emergency Rules
The old APA provided for the promulgation of an emergency rule when
an agency determined that it was necessary for the immediate preservation of
public health, peace, safety, or general welfare. 39 Such rules took effect immediately without prior notice of action, publication, or procedural due process and remained in effect for ninety days, the only challenge being by
declaratory judgment in the courts. 40 Many states that have enacted similar
provisions for the promulgation of emergency rules have required the agency
to certify to some other governmental authority that an immediate threat
necessitating prompt action actually exists. 41 Failure to so require has resulted
in agencies labeling almost every promulgation an emergency rule, permitting
agencies to avoid the normal procedural requirements.42 In fact, the Florida
Law Revision Commission found, when drafting its proposed version of the
new APA, that a substantial percentage of all rules adopted by state agencies
were adopted as emergency rules. 4 3 The new APA has revised the emergency
rulemaking process so as to provide minimum fairness to affected persons,
based on the circumstances of each agency's specific needs. Under the new
procedure emergency rules may be promulgated, but they must be published
with a declaration of the basis upon which the emergency is founded. Furthermore the agency's finding of immediate danger is judicially reviewable. 44
Notice and Publication
The 1961 act provided for the adoption of a rule after public hearing,
notice of which was to be given between ten and thirty days prior to the hearing date. 45 Such practice resulted in variations among agencies because different notice was given for different rules. To provide greater uniformity in
notification, the new APA specifies a minimum of fourteen days' notice by
4
mail and twenty-one days' notice by publication. 6
Another problem under the old act was the means by which notice was
communicated. Notice was to be given in one of three ways: (1) publication in
four papers of general circulation (which tended to give notice to only those
persons who read local notices with close scrutiny); (2) mailed notice to parties
38.

FLA. STAT.

39.

Former Fla. Stat. §120.041(3) (1961).

40.

Id.

§11.60 (Supp. 1974).

41.

See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §11422.1 (West 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. §77-423 (1969);
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 30A, §2(3) (1973); NEB. REV. STAT. §84-907 (1971); OHIo REV. CoDE ANN.
§119.03(F) (1969).
42. F. HEADY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE LEGISLATION
43. REPORTER'S COMMENT, supra note 35.
44. FLA. STAT. §120.54(8)(a)(S) (Supp. 1974).
45. Former Fla. Stat. §120.041 (1961).
46. FLA. STAT. §120.54(1) (Supp. 1974).
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who requested to be placed on the agency's mailing list; and (3) mailed notice
to affected licensees or association where the proposed rule pertained to the
licensing of the particular trade, business, or occupation.4 7 Notice was not
given to other persons or other agencies who might have had an interest in
the rule, but who had not previously contacted the agency. The new APA
adopts the Revised Model Act's policy of requiring state agencies to give advance notice by methods better calculated to reach all persons having an interest in the proposed rule.48 Mailed notice is to be sent to all persons expressly named in the rule and all persons who have requested advance notice
at least fourteen days prior to the mailing.49 The notice, in all cases, is to include either the text of the proposed rule or a reference to the location of the
text.56 Further, and most importantly, -the new APA provides effective notice
of all agency rulemaking to the-general public through a new publication, the
FloridaAdministrative Weekly.51 The Weekly will give at least twenty-one
days' notice of all agency hearings and'a summary of all proposed rules, and
will be available by subscription, by direct mailing, and to the general public
by posting in certain public buildings throughout the state.5 2 Several states
have adopted similar programs of publication in official periodicals 5 with

varying results; success has usually depended upon the adequacy of funding.54
Proceduresfor Adoption of Rules
Increasingly, commentators have recognized that in the interest of generating trust in agency actions, basic elements of fairness and procedural due
process demand that agencies be compelled to conform to essential procedural
rules.5 Also, because parties affected by administrative rulings are often seen
as being in the most favored position to criticize such rulings constructively, it

47.

Former Fla. Stat. §120.041(4) (1961).
ALI REvIsED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRAThVE PROCEDURE Acr §3(a)(1) (1970) [hereinafter
cited as RMSAPA]. See Comment, Administrative Procedure Legislation Among the States,
49 CoRNEL. L.Q. 634 (1964).
49.. FA. STAT. §120.54(1)(a) (Supp. 1974) provides in part: "The notice shall be mailed
...
to all persons named in the proposed rule, and to all persons who have made requests
of the agency for advance notice of its proceedings at least fourteen days prior to such
mailing." -48.

50. FLA. STAT. §120.54(1)(a) (Supp. 1974).
51. FL.A. STAT. §120.54(1)(b) (Supp. 1974). See also FLA. STAT. §§120.55(1)(c)(1)-(4) (Supp.
1974) providing that the department of state shall: "Publish a weekly pamphlet entitled the
'Florida Administrative Weekly' which shall contain: 1. A summary of, and an index to, all
rules filed during the preceding week. 2. All hearing notices required by §120.54(1), showing
the time, place, and date of the hearings and the summaries of all rules proposed for consideration. 3. Other material required-by law. 4. Other material deemed useful by the department."
52. FLA. STAT. §§120.55(1)(c), (3)(a), (b) (Supp. 1974.)

53. E.g., ALAsKA
§227.021 (1957).

STAT.

§44.62.190 (1962);

CAL.

Gov'T

CODE

§11423 (1966); WIs.

STAT. ANN.

54. E.g., F HEADY, supra note 42, at 33-40.
55. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 48, at 647,
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is necessary that well-considered administrative procedural legislation accord
interested persons an opportunity to participate in rulemaking activities.56
The old APA provided only for the publication of rules. It did not prescribe
procedures to be followed by the agency in carrying out its rulemaking functions. 57 Further, the Florida supreme court held, under that act, that rulemaking functions were quasi-legislative and accordingly immune from hearing requirements. 5 The new APA makes several changes, providing greater
uniformity and public participation in agency rulemaking. As in the Revised
Model Act, 59 a public hearing on all substantive rules is required when requested by any interested person.60 In addition, the agency either must grant or
deny in writing a rulemaking request by any person. 61 The act further establishes a procedure by which one may challenge the constitutionality (delegability) of a proposed rule before a new agency, the division of administrative
hearings. 62 The primary purpose of the division is to provide for the alleviation of possible conflicts of interest by providing independent hearing examiners, but in this context the division also serves as an objective extra-agency
vehicle for determining questions of delegability raised by proposed rules.63
This provision appears unique; many states entertain challenges to delegabil64
ity by declaratory judgment in their courts.

Filing requirements have also been changed. Formerly, rules simply were
filed with the department of state and generally became effective the day after
filing.65 The new APA introduces an innovative step in the rulemaking process by creating the Administrative Procedure Committee, a standing commit56. Id.
57. Former Fla. Stat. §§120.031-.051 (1961).

58. See text accompanying note 22 supra. See, e.g., Daniel v. State Turnpike Authority,
213 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1968), appeal after remand, 237 So. 2d 222 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
59. RMSAPA §.
60. FLA. STAT. §120.54(2) (Supp. 1974). See text accompanying note 25 supra.

61. FLA. STAT. §120.54(4) (Supp. 1974) provides in pertinent part: "Any person regulated
by an agency or having a substantial interest in an agency rule may petition an agency to
adopt, amend, or repeal a rule ....
The petition shall specify the proposed rule and action
requested. Not later than thirty calendar days after the date of filing a petition, the agency

shall initiate rulemaking proceedings under this act, otherwise comply with the requested
action, or deny the petition with a written statement of its reasons for the denial."

62.

63.

FLA. STAT. §120.65 (1974).
FLA. STAT. §120.54(3) (1974)

provides in part: "If the proposed rule contains any
provision not relating exclusively to organization, practice, or procedure, then any substantially affected person may seek an administrative determination of the validity of the
proposed rule on the following grounds: that the proposed rule is an invalid exercise of
validly delegated legislative authority; or, that the proposed rule is an exercise of invalidly
delegated legislative authority."
64. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §44.62.300 (1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §41-1007-A (1956);
CAL. GOV'T CODE

§11440 (West 1966);

GA. CODE ANN.

§3A-111

(1974);

HAWAII

REv. STAT.

§91-7 (1968); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §249 (1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 30A, §7 (1973); MNN.
STAT. §15.0416; NEB. REV. STAT. §84.911 (1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. §67-26-25 (1953); N.C. GEN .
STAT.

§150-32 (1974); OHio

VA. CODE ANN.

REV. CODE ANN.

§119.11 .(1969); ORE. REV. CODE §183.400 (1973);
ANN. §34.04.070 (1965); Wis. STAT. ANN.

§9-6.9 (1964); WASH. REV. CODE

§227.05(1) (1957).
65. Former Fla. Stat. §120.041 (1961).
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tee of state legislators, which is intended to provide legislative supervision of
agency rulemaking.6 6 Each agency must file with the committee a copy of each
rule it proposes to adopt and a detailed written statement of the facts justifying its enactment. The committee then examines the rule to determine whether
it is within the agency's statutory authority. If the committee rejects the rule,
it so certifies to the agency with a detailed written statement of its objections.67
The agency must then modify the rule or withdraw it within thirty days.6 8
The purpose of this section of the act is to curb the unwarranted exercise
of administrative discretion. 69 Other advantages are that it brings the legislative
branch of the government, which grants the agency's authority, into closer contact with the administrative branch; it mandates a greater degree of administrative responsibility to the legislature; and it permits agencies to call upon the
legislature to assume a direct responsibility in settling difficult problems of
policy.7 0 Nevertheless, any potential benefits flowing from this procedural
hurdle must be weighed against the extent to which the procedure hampers
the administrative process. At least twelve other states have employed similar
committees with varying results.71 In Michigan problems arose when its committee determined not only whether certain rules were a valid exercise of the
agency's authority, but also when arguments about substance were considered
as well.72 Another problem is that elaborate and time-consuming procedures
allow agencies to evade controls by the simple tactic of issuing fewer formal
rules. 7 3 Such results defeat the primary aim of recent procedural legislation in
the field of rulemaking by isolating the rules from those affected by them. One
critic of the administrative process believes that negative statutory curbs are
inferior to a policy of encouragement to agencies to raise standards in administrative rulemaking.74
ADJUDICAnTON

Under the old APA, adjudication did not require a hearing unless a party's
legal rights, duties, privileges, or immunities were determined in the proceeding.79 Narrow interpretation denied hearings unless exact legal rights
FILA. STAT. §11.60(3) (Supp. 1974).
67. FLA. STAT. §120.43(10)(a) (Supp. 1974).

66.

68. FLA. STAT. §120.54(10)(a) (Supp. 1974) provides in pertinent part: "Proposed rules
modified to meet committee objections shall be resubmitted ... and the committee shall give
priority to modified rules when setting its ageida."
69. 1 F. CooPE, STATE ADMINiSTRATIVE LAW 221 (1965).

70. [1955-1956] D. HOVE, LEGISLATIVE REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE RuLEs, CuRRENT TRENDS
IN STATE LGIRsLATION at 167.
See ALAsKA STAT. §44.62.320 (1962); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§4-170 to -171 (1973);
(1967); KAN. STAT. ANN. §77-425 (1969); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§13.087 (1974); MicH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§24.251-.252 (1973); NEB. REv. STAT. §84-904 (1971);
OK.LA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, §308 (1965); S.C. CODE ANN. §1-11 (1962); VA. CODE ANN §9-6.9(d)
(1964); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §34.04.160 (1965); Wis. STAT. ANN. §13.56 (1972).
71.

IowA CODE ANN. §§17A.2-.11

72. F. HEADY, supra note 42, at 60.

73. Id. at 61.
74. Id. at 62.
75.

See, e.g., Bay Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 229 So. 2d 302 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
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could be found. The procedure has now been altered so that one of two types
of hearings is required in all proceedings "in which the substantial interests
of a party" are determined by an agency.7 6 Even rulemaking proceedings may
require a hearing, provided that a party timely asserts that his substantial
interests will be affected in the proceeding and that the ordinary rulemaking
77
procedure will not adequately protect his interests.
The types of proceedings provided are designated "formal" 7 8 and "informal."7 The two are disitinguished by the extent to which each affords due

process safeguards. The formal procedure, which includes oral argument, is
appropriate whenever a material fact is in issue and the substantial interest of
a party are affected. The informal procedure is appropriate where only questions of law are in issue.80 In the case of informal proceedings, all that is required is the opportunity to submit written briefs.8 l
Although the statutory division of types of hearings appears to be unique
among states with uniform administrative procedure acts, it is in accord with
the general trend in administrative law. The key is no longer characterization
of a proceeding as quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative for the purpose of determining hearing requirements. Instead, the present guiding principle is that
due process requires only trial-type hearings for resolving disputed adjudicative
facts. Issues of law, on the other hand, because they do not pertain to a par82
ticular party, are often best resolved through written presentations.
Pre-hearingProcedures
Pleadings and notice can cause major problems in the achievement of due
process in any general administrative procedure legislation. Fair notice should
always be given to assure that due process will be served; yet technical allegations should not be required lest substantive rights be dependent on the turn
of a phrase. Pleadings and notice in administrative procedure should be intended only to afford interested parties adequate opportunity to prepare. 8' In
concert with this policy, the old APA provided that notice was to be given to
the parties affected by agency action in a timely manner, informing them of the
time, place, and nature of any hearing and matters of fact and law to be asserted.8 4 Since each agency promulgated its own rules as to what constituted
timely notice, however, a lack of uniformity among the agencies resulted. 85
76. FLA. STAT. §120.57 (Supp. 1974).
77. FLA. STAT. §120.54 (Supp. 1974). In the event a party timely asserts that a rulemaking proceeding will affect his substantial interests and that the ordinary procedure will
not adequately protect his interests, FLA. STAT. §120.57 (1974) provides in part: "If the agency
determines that rulemaking proceedings are not adequate to protect a party's interests, it
shall convene a separate proceeding and proceed under the provisions of this section."
78. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1) (Supp. 1974).
79. FLA. STAT. §120.57(2) (Supp. 1974).
80. FLA. STAT. §120.57 (Supp. 1974).
81. FLA. STAT. §120.57(2)(a)(2) (Supp. 1974).
82. K. DAVIS, supra note 2, at 192.
83. Comment, supra note 48, at 642.
84. Former Fla. Stat. §120.23 (1961).
85. See, e.g., Parker v. Williams, 224 So. 2d 399 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1969) (twenty days
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The new APA attempts to cure the variation among agencies, insofar as formal
proceedings are concerned, -by requiring that notice occur no later than
fourteen days prior to the hearing.8 6 In informal proceedings, as under the
old act, notice is to be timely with timeliness based upon a reasonableness
standard. Each agency is permitted, in such situations, to give notice in accord
with its own rules. 87 Because this provision is nearly equivalent to the notice
formerly required under the old act, case law construing that act may apply.
Past decisions have found eight days inadequate to comply with due process,88
but have sanctioned twenty days' notice.8 9
As to the sufficiency of notice, the informal procedure adopts the reasonableness standard that was applied by courts when determining this question
under the old act. 0 The procedure for formal proceedings also requires that
notice be reasonable and, like the old APAj requires a statement of the time,
place, and nature of the hearing.91 Additionally, reference to the particular
sections-of the statute or rules involved, under which authority is being exercised, must be stated 9 2 Further, and of greatest importance from the standpoint of due process, a short and plain statement of the subject matter of the
hearing is to be given. Although the agency may omit the statement if it is
unable to state the matters in sufficient detail at the time the initial notice is
given, the agency is obligated, upon timely written application, to provide a
9
statement no less than three days prior to the hearing. 3
Conduct of the Hearing
The 1961 APA, section 120.24, provided that an agency, its head, or an
agency employee was to sit as hearing examiner9 4 Furthermore, section 120.09
provided for the voluntary or involuntary disqualification of elected or appointed persons authorized to exercise judicial power for bias, prejudice, interest, or other causes for which a circuit judge may be disqualified. 95 These
provisions make it clear that conflicts of interest can arise between, for instance, an elected agency head and his agency or between agency employees
and the agency. Such a conflict might arise, for example, when an attorney
from the agency's legal department assists in preparing the agency's case, then
notice sufficient); Wilson v. Pest Control Comm'n, 199 So. 2d 777 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1967) (eight
days notice insuffident).
86. FLA. STAT. §120.57(l)(a) (Supp. 1974).
87. FLA. STAT. §120.57(2)(a)(1) (Supp. 1974).
88. Wilson v. Pest Control Comm'n, 199 So. 2d 777 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
89. Parker v. Williams, 224 So. 2d 399 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
90. FLA. STAT. §120.57(2)(a)(1) (Supp. 1974) provides that the agency, in accordance with

its rules of procedure shall "[g]ive reasonable notice."
91. FLA. STAT. §120.57(I)(a)(1) (Supp. 1974).
92. FLA. STAT. §120.57(i)(a)(3) (Supp. 1974). Also required is a statement of the legal
authority and jurisdiction under which the hearing is to be held. FLA. STAT. §120.57(l)(a)(2)
(Supp. 1974).

93. FLA. STAT. §120.57(1)(a)(4) (Supp. 1974).
- 94. Former Fla. Stat. §120.24(1) (1961).
95. Former Fla. Stat. §120.09 (1961).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1975

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1975], Art. 4
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVII

sits as hearing examiner and subsequently advises the agency head about the
matter's disposition.96 Section 120.2597 further enhanced the potential for due
process infringement by failing to provide an impartial hearing where conflicts of interest existed. Additionally, the insurance commissioner, the treasurer,
and the commissioner of agriculture were expressly exempted from coverage
by the disqualification provision,98 and other governmental officers were excepted by judicial decision, 99 increasing the likelihood of unfairness.
Another problem relating to hearing officers is that of subdelegation. Under
section 120.25 the hearing examiner was supposed to submit his findings of
fact and law in the form of a recommended order to the agency. 109 The agency
would then consider the entire record before it and render its final decision.
Subdelegation would occur when the agency abdicated its final determination
responsibilities by allowing the examiner to fully control the disposition of
the case. 101
In the case of formal proceedings, the new APA attempts to insure an
impartial hearing through several changes. The act establishes the new division
of administrative hearings, responsible for providing impartial, independent,
and qualified hearing examiners.102 The division director assigns officers at the
request of the agency in adjudicatory hearings, and the division itself hears
0
challenges of delegation. 1°
Furthermore, any party to the hearing may request
the disqualification of any hearing officer by filing an affidavit with the division
prior to the hearing.10 4 All persons employed by the division as examiners must
have been members in good standing of the Florida Bar for at least three
years.

05

The independent hearing examiner approach, although not a common
feature of most state administrative procedure acts, is not unique to Florida. 10 6
96. REPoRTER's

COMIMENT, supra note 35.
97. Former Fla. Stat. §120.25 (1961) provided in part: "The hearing examiner shall have
authority, subject to the agency's published rules, to: (1) Administer oaths and affirmations,
(2) Issue subpoenas authorized by law, (3) Rule upon offers of .proof and receive relevant
evidence, (4) Take or cause depositions to be taken whenever the ends of justice would be
served thereby, (5) Regulate the course of the hearing, (6) Hold conferences for the settlement or simplification of the issues by consent of the parties, (7) Dispose of procedural requests or similar matters, and (8) Enter any order to carry out the purposes of this law, or
as to a member of the agency or hearing examiner make recommended orders to the agency,
as the case may be, which orders shall include findings of fact."
98. Former Fla. Stat. §120.09(l) (1961).
99. See, e.g., City of Opa Locka v. State ex rel. Tepper, 257 So. 2d 100 (3d D.C.A. Fla.
1972) (APA section concerning recusation to be inapplicable to city commission).
100. Former Fla. Stat. §120.25(8) (1961).
101. See, e.g., Nicholas v. Wainwright, 152 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1963) (agency cannot abdicate
responsibility for its final action to the hearing officer, the agency's functionary).
102. FLA. STAT. §120.65 (Supp. 1974).
103. FLA. STAT. §120.57(l)(d) (Supp. 1974).
104. FLA. STAT. §120.57(l)(d) (Supp. 1974) provides in part: "Any party may request the
disqualification of any hearing officer by filing an affadavit with the division prior to the
taking of evidence at a hearing, stating the grounds with particularity."
105. FLA. STAT. §120.65(2) (Supp. 1974).
106. See ALASKA STAT. §44.62.350 (1966); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §2401 (Supp. 1973);
Mo. ANN. STAT. §161.252 (Vernon 1973).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol27/iss3/4

12

Mancusi-Ungaro: Rulemaking and Adjudication Under the Florida Administrative Proc
19751

RULEMAKING

AND ADJUDICATION

California has had a similar program in existence since 1945.107 Shortly after
its adoption, agency officials in California expressed satisfaction with its system. Lay members of professional licensing boards indicated appreciation for
the assistance of legally trained hearing officers in gathering evidence and discerning issues. 108 However, some dissatisfaction was voiced because of the
rotation of hearing officers, leading to complaints of inadequate familiarity
with the special problems and policies of the particular agency. 0 9 As a result,
attempts were made by agencies, with the approval of California's Division of
Administrative Procedure, to hold meetings to familiarize hearing officers with
general agency policies in order to facilitate uniformity in such matters as
imposition of penalties."10 The Florida act, unlike the California statute,
anticipates such criticism by expressly providing that on the request of any
agency the division shall assign hearing officers to conduct hearings with due
regard to the expertise required for the particular matter."'
Another criticism of the California act is its requirement that all hearing
officers be members of the California Bar for at least five years. 1 2 There is
some feeling that a strict insistence on five years' experience frequently disqualifies many who are competent and might even have the effect of attracting
mediocre lawyers whose sole credential is accumulated experience."3 The
three-year requirement of the Florida APA, although shorter, is subject to
similar criticism.
Hearing examiners are not assigned to those agencies exempted by new
section 120.57(1) nor to formal proceedings before agency heads. 1 4 These express exclusions in the Florida act appear to dilute the due process benefits
of the independent hearing examiner system. Also, the possibility exists that
some agencies could completely circumvent the hearing officer requirement by
107. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§11370.3, 11512, 11517 (West 1973). The California statutes provide two methods of holding hearings. Similar to Florida, under the first method the hearing officer hears the case alone. He prepares a proposed decision that is filed with the agency
and served on the other parties in the case. The agency may adopt the decision of the hearing officer or may itself decide the case on the records after giving the parties an opportunity
to be heard. Unlike Florida, under the second method the case is heard by the agency with
the active assistance of the hearing officer who presides at the hearing, rules on the admissibility of evidence, and advises the agency on matters of law. He also is present during
consideration of the case by the agency and, upon request, assists and advises the agency in
deciding the case. Id.
108. F. HEADY, supra note 42, at 83.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 80-84.
111. FLA. STAT. §120.57(I)(d) (Supp. 1974).
112. CAL. Gov'T CODE §11502 (West 1973).
113. See F. HEADY, supra note 42, at 85.
114. Hearing examiners do not conduct formal hearings if the hearings are held: (1) before agency heads other than those in the department of professional and occupational
regulations; (2) before a member of an agency other than agency heads within the department of professional and occupational regulations; (3) before the industrial relations commission, judges of industrial claims, unemployment compensation appeals referees, public
service commission or its examiners, or hearings regarding drivers licensing; (4) within the
division of family services; or if the division of administrative hearings is a party. FLA. STAT.
§§120.57(I)(a)1-6 (Supp. 1974).
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conducting all formal proceedings before agency heads. Further, in informal
proceedings hearing officers are not assigned. 115 In the case of informal proceedings, however, the failure to provide an independent hearing officer does
not raise the same due process considerations because oral presentations are
not conducted.
Attention to due process strictures has led to further changes in hearing
procedure. Under section 120.26 of the 1961 act, extensive due process safeguards were provided. Every party to an agency proceeding had the right to
present his case or defense by oral and documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, to conduct cross-examination, and to submit proposed findings
and conclusions with supporting reasons therefor." 6 In order to avail oneself
of the above provisions, however, judicial interpretation of the old APA required a finding of an exact legal right, duty, or immunity to which the right
to a hearing attached." 7 Thus, hearings were often denied, in which case section 120.26 did not come into play. Under the new APA the alternatives are
no longer maximum due process or no due process. Rather, a hearing is required any time the substantial interests of a person will be affected by
agency action. The hearing procedure is formal if material issues of fact are
involved; informal if only matters of law are in issue." 18
Procedures for due process during formal hearings" 9 are essentially the
same as were provided in hearings under the 1961 act. 1 20 Regardless of

whether an independent hearing examiner is conducting the hearing, if
formal procedure is appropriate, each person authorized to participate has
the right to present his case or defense by oral and documentary evidence; to
submit rebuttal evidence and conduct cross-examination; and to submit proposed findings, conclusions, and supporting reasons therefor. The only additional provision under the new APA is that, when appropriate, the general
public may be given an opportunity to present oral and written evidence.121
In informal proceedings, on the other hand, the procedural requirements are
less stringent. The agency need only give affected parties or their counsel an
opportunity, at a convenient time and place, to present to the agency written
evidence in opposition to the agency's action or refusal to act, or a written

115. FLA. STAT. §120.57(2) (Supp. 1974).
116. Former Fla. Stat. §120.26 (1961).
117. See, e.g., Bay Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 229 So. 2d 302 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1969); text
accompanying note 22 supra.
118. FLA. STAT. §120.57 (Supp. 1974).
119. FLA. STAT. §120.57(1) (Supp. 1974).
120. See former Fla. Stat. §120.26 (1961).
121. FLA. STAT. §120.57(l)(j)(5) (Supp. 1974) provides in part: "When appropriate, the
general public may be given an opportunity to present oral or written communications. If
the agency proposes to consider such material then all parties shall be given an opportunity
to cross-examine or challenge or rebut it." This language implies that the agency need not
grant the privilege of public participation if, in its discretion, it believes the matters in issue can be resolved efficiently and fairly without public input. It is not clear whether in
granting the privilege the agency can pick and choose among particular interest groups and
individuals.
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statement challenging the grounds upon which the agency has chosen to justify
2
its action or inaction.l2
The extent to which due process was provided under the old APA is
limited in the case of informal proceedings under the new act. Such limitation
is not surprising because the old statute provided greater due process than
hearings constitutionally require.123- Generally, at both the federal and state
levels, the approach has been to determine the extent of due process appropriate in each case on the basis of either -a balancing of interests or a
determination of whether matters of fact or law are in issue. Where matters
solely of law are in issue, the usual view is that an oral hearing is unnecessary
for due process purposes and that it is sufficient to provide an opportunity for
the submission of written briefs. 2 4 The unfortunate result, however, has often
been the denial of any forum in such cases.' 25 Although the new Florida APA
adopts the fact-law distinction, in no instance can a hearing be denied. By so
providing, the act may be an improvement over other states and the federal
model from a due process standpoint, although any benefits must be weighed
against the extent to which such provision checks administrative discretion and
encumbers the administrative process.
Under the old APA the in-hearing procedure, beyond the requirements of
due process, was primarily contained in section 120.25 - Agency's and Hearing
Examiner's Powers. The agency or examiner was empowered to administer
oaths, issue subpoenas authorized by law, rule upon offers of proof and receive relevant evidence, take depositions or cause them to be taken, and
regulate the course of hearings. 126 Under that provision the Florida supreme
court held, in Deel Motors, Inc. v. Department of Commerce,227 that the technical and formal rules of procedure, which govern in courts of law, are not
applicable to administrative proceedings. 28 Under the new Florida APA such
powers as are enumerated above have application only to formal proceedings.29
Section 120.58(1)(b) of the new act provides that an agency or independent
hearing examiner has the power to swear witnesses and take their testimony
under oath, to issue subpoenas on the written request of any party or upon
its own motion, and to effect discovery on the written request of any party by
any means available to the courts and in the manner provided in the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure. The major change here is that discovery now comports with the Florida rules, and to that extent Deel is overruled.13O This requirement is somewhat unusual among state administrative procedure acts.'3 1
122.

FLA. STAT.

§120.57(2)(a)(2) (Supp. 1974).

123. See generally 1 F. Coopra, supra note 69, at 135-59.

124. K. DAvis, supra note 2, at 157.
125. Id. at 168.
126. Former Fla. Stat. §120.25 (1961).
-127. 252 So. 2d 389 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1969).

128. Id. at 394.
129. FLA. STAT. §120.58 (Supp. 1974).
130. New Mexico and Wyoming also provide for the availability of all discovery procedures otherwise available in their courts upon the demand of any party. N.M. STAT. ANN.
§4-32-I0(A) (1974); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §9-276.25 (1971).
131. FLA. STAT. §120.58(1)(b) (Supp. 1974).
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For instance, the Model Act and the Revised Model Act omit the subject, determining that discovery powers are usually granted in the statutes establishing the particular agency and are better left to particularized treatment. Another approach taken by several state acts permits agencies to order and obtain any depositions the agency deems necessary. 132 Many commentators agree
that although discovery is necessary to insure fairness, there is no reason compelling uniform discovery procedures because discovery carries with it the
potential tactic of procedural abuse that could unduly burden the administrative process. 33
1 34
Florida is in the mainstream in the strength of its subpoena power.
Under the old act the agency conducting the hearing had the authority,
pursuant to its own rules, to "issue subpoenas authorized by law."'' 3- The new
act removes that discretionary power from the agency with all subpoenas now
issuing upon the written request of any party.136 Further, the new APA omits
the language "authorized by law." Although never litigated in Florida,
narrowly, deprivequivalent language at the federal level has been construed
37
ing important federal agencies of subpoena powers.
Another problem under the old act was the absence of effective sanctions
for failure to comply with subpoenas. In a workmen's compensation case, Kirk
v. Publix Super Markets,

3

the hearing examiner assumed the power, under

the 1961 APA, to dismiss a complaint after the petitioner refused to produce
certain documents. The Florida supreme court overruled his decision, however, citing the workmen's compensation statute, which required the officer in
such cases to certify the matter to the circuit court. 3 9 The new act, rather than
132. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §3A-114 (1974); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §82-4211 (Supp.
1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, §315 (1965); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §34.04.090 (1973); W. VA.
CODE ANN. §29A-5-1(c) (1971).
133.

Note, Discovery in State Administrative Adjudication, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 767, 780-88

(1968); see, e.g., 1 F. CooPER, supra note 69, at 294; 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE,

§8.02 (1958).
134. At least twenty-two other states have provided for the subpoena power although the
MSAPA and RMSAPA make no provision therefor. ALASKA STAT. §44.62.430 (1962); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. §41-1010(4) (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. §5-708(g) (1973); CAL. GOV'T. CODE §11510
(1973); GA. CODE ANN. §3A-114 (1974); HAWAI REV. STAT. §92-12 (1974); IND. ANN. STAT.
§63-3021 (Burns 1961); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §49.956 (West 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5,

§2406 (1964); MASS.
Mo.
STAT.

ANN. LAWS ch. 30A, §12 (1973); MicH. Coaip. LAWS ANN. §24.273 (1973);
§536.077 (Vernon 1973); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §82-4211 (1974); NEB. REV.
§84-914 (1971); N.D. CENT. CODE §28-32-09 (1974); Omo REV. CODE ANN. §119.09 (1969);

ANN. STAT.

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.

75, §315 (1965);

ORE. RED. STAT.

§183.440 (1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71,

§200 (1972); S.D. COMPILED LAwS ANN. §1-26-19.1 (1967); WASH. REV. CoDE ANN. §34.04.090
(1973);Wyo. STAT. ANN. §9-276.25 (1971).
135. Former Fla. Stat. §120.25(2) (1961).
136. FLA. STAT. §120.58(l)(b) (Supp. 1974) provides in part: "An agency or its duly empowered presiding officer or a hearing officer has the power ... to issue subpoenas upon the
written request of any party or upon its own motion .... "
137. See, e.g., Ubiotica Corp. v. FDA, 427 F.2d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1970); Hyser v. Reed,
318 F.2d 225, 236-37 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1973); see K. DAvIS, supra note 2,
at 200.
138. 185 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1966).
139. Id. at 164.
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providing uniform sanctions, adopts the scheme of the Kirk case, providing
that any person who fails to comply with a subpoena shall be in contempt of

the agency and subject to any penalties the agency is authorized to prescribe
by law.14 0 Thus, the statutes delegating authority to the agency will determine
the extent of sanctions available.

Another major change in hearing procedure lies in the area of admissible
evidence. Under the old APA, probative effect was given only to evidence that
would be admissible in civil proceedings in Florida courts. At the same time
the statute provided that due regard was to be given to the technical and
complicated subject matter agencies must handle, and the exclusionary rules
of evidence were not to be used to prevent the receipt of evidence having substantial probative effect. 14 1 Litigation arose as a result of these contradictory
provisions. The courts responded by interpreting the statutory language
liberally, stating that as a general rule administrative tribunals are not bound
by the strict and technical rules of evidence.142 The new APA is in agreement
with the case law. Essentially, the discretion of the hearing officer determines
admissibility. In all proceedings irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious
evidence is to be excluded. However, all other evidence of a kind commonly
relied upon by "reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs" is
admissible, regardless of whether admissible in the Florida courts. Hearsay
evidence is even admissible although findings may be based upon it only if it
would be admissible over objection in civil actions. 43 A similar provision appears in the Revised Model Act 44 and is in accord with the general trend to

140. FLA. STAT. §120.58(3) (Supp. 1974) provides in pertinent part: "Any person failing
to comply with a subpoena or order directing discovery issued under the authority of this
act shall be in contempt of the agency issuing the subpoena or order and subject to any
penalties which the agency is authorized by law to prescribe ....
" However, FLA. STAT.
§120.58(2) (Supp. 1974) provides a procedure by which subpoenas may be challenged. During
the period in which the validity of the subpoena is being determined, the individual desiring to quash the subpoena is immune from contempt proceedings.
141. Former Fla. Stat. §120.27 (1961) provided: "The hearing examiner, member of the
agency, or agency shall give probative effect to evidence which would be admissible in civil
proceedings in the courts of this state, but in receiving evidence due regard shall be given to
the technical and highly complicated subject matter agencies must handle and the exclusionary rules of evidence shall not be used to prevent the receipt of evidence having substantial probative effect. Otherwise effect shall be given to the rules of evidence recognized
by law in this state."
142. See Peden v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors 8- Embalmers, 189 So. 2d 526 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1966); Sauls v. De Loach, 182 So. 2d 804 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1966); State Bd. of
Dental Examiners v. Feinglass, 166 So. 2d 686 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
143. FA. STAT. §120.58(l)(a) (Supp. 1974) provides: "Irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly
repetitious evidence shall be excluded, but all other evidence of a type commonly relied
upon by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs shall be admissible, whether
or not such evidence would be admissible in a trial in the courts of Florida. Any part of the
evidence may be received in written form, and all testimony of parties and witnesses shall be
made under oath. Hearsay evidence may be used for the purpose of supplementing or explaining other evidence, but it shall not be sufficient in itself to support a finding unless it
would be admissible over objection in civil actions."

144. RMSAPA §10(1).
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replace unduly restrictive rules of evidence with discretion. 14 5 Increasingly,
the presiding officer is allowed to admit and rely upon the kind of evidence
146
upon which responsible persons are accustomed to rely in serious affairs.
A related evidentiary issue is official notice. Under the 1961 act a party was
afforded, upon timely written request, an opportunity to rebut official notice
of a material fact.147 The provision was never litigated. Under the new Florida
APA a similar provision has not been included, although official notice is
indirectly recognized. 148 Section 120.57(1)(f), governing the record in formal
proceedings, provides in subsection 3 that a statement of matters officially
recognized shall be included. Section 120.57(l)(h) provides that findings of
fact shall be based exclusively on the evidence of record and on matters officially recognized. Although it is not clear that facts officially recognized are
subject to rebuttal, as under the old act, such a result would seem desirable, in
light of procedural fairness, and likely, since due process appears to be the

14 9
primary focus of the new APA.

Another important procedural element is the preparation of the record.
In Bay National Bank v. Dickinson,15° decided under the old act, the Florida
supreme court stated that the purpose of the hearing requirement of the APA
was to insure a proper record of the proceeding so that aggrieved parties could
obtain judicial review.15t The act provided that the agency would accurately
and completely preserve the testimony and exhibits in the agency proceeding
and the recommended order together wth all pleadings, briefs, and requests
filed in the agency proceeding.1 52 According to decisions of the Florida courts,
this record was to be the sole basis of the agency's findings in order to insure
1 53
meaningful judicial review.
The new APA sets out with greater detail what the record is to include. In
formal proceedings the record is to consist of notices, pleadings, motions,
intermediate rulings, evidence received or considered, matters officially recognized, proposed findings and exceptions, any decision, opinion, recommended order or report by the hearing officer, all staff memoranda or data
submitted prior to disposition, and all matters placed on the record after an

145. K. DAVIS, supra note 2, at 271.
146. Id.
147. Former Fla. Stat. §120.24(2) (1961).
148. FLA. STAT. §§120.57(l)(f), (h) (Supp. 1974).
149. "The basic principle is that extra-record facts should be assumed whenever it is
convenient to assume them, except that convenience should always yield to the requirement
of procedural fairness that parties should have opportunity to meet in the appropriate
fashion all facts that influence the disposition of the case." K. DAVIS, supra note 2, at 316.
150. 229 So. 2d 302 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
151. Id. at 306.
152. Former Fla. Stat. §120.24 (1961).
153. See, e.g., Central Truck Lines, Inc. v. King, 146 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1972) (order of
Railroad and Public Utilities Commission invalid for lack of findings upon which Commission predicated its conclusion); Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 150 So. 2d
504 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1963). "It is important . . . that the decision be based exclusively on
matters that appear in the record. Otherwise, the hearing could be reduced to a mere talisman; and judicial review would become meaningless." 1 F. COOPER, supra note 69, at 430.
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ex parte communication.154 In informal proceedings the record shall consist

of notice and summary of the grounds, evidence received and considered, all
written statements submitted by persons and parties, any decision overruling
objections, and all matters placed on the record after an ex parte communication.- 5 The inclusion of the above elements, which for the most part appear
in the Revised Model Act,1 56 serve to insure that the administrative decision
will be a fully informed one, and that the administrative record will afford a
proper foundation for judicial review.1 5? The new APA further expressly
provides that the agency's decision in formal proceedings be based solely on
the record.r 8
Post-hearingProcedure
In state as well as in federal administrative agencies, the formulation of the
final decision may be influenced substantially by post-hearing maneuverings.
Critical to this last phase of the adjudication process is whether those persons
rendering the final decision conducted the hearing, whether those responsible
have fully mastered the record, and whether there have been any ex parte
communciations369 Furthermore, although the Model Acts do not so provide,
.some states at this juncture provide for a procedure by which the agency may
,review its decision in order to save the time and expense of judicial review.160
-The old APA provided little in the wvay of uniform post-hearing procedure.
Parties were entitled only to prompt notification of agency decisions,6 1 and
were permitted to submit and argue exceptions thereto. 162 Judicial interpretation added other requirements: the agency was not allowed to abdicate its
responsibility for the final decision by allowing the hearing officer to fully
dispose of the case,6 3 the agency was further required to include statements of
4
findings on essential issues with notification of its decision to affected parties.16
The new act provides a much more extensive post-hearing procedure. In
the case of hearings conducted before hearing officers, the examiner is to com-

plete and submit to the agency and all parties a recommended order consisting

of his findings of fact, conclusions of law, interpretation of administrative
154. FLA. STAT. §120.57(l)() (Supp. 1974).
155. FLA. STAT. §120.57(2)(b) (Supp. 1974).

156.. RMSAPA §9.
157. Comment, supra note 48, at 647-48..
158. FLA. STAT. §120.57(1)(h) (Supp. 1974).
159. 1 F. CooPER, supra note 69, at 240-44.

160. 2 F. CooPER, supra note 69, at 433.
161. Former Fla. Stat. §120.26(7) (1961). Although the APA in this section provided for
prompt notice of agency action, the act nowhere provided for prompt action.
162.. Former Fla. Stat. §120.26(4) (1961).
163. See Nicholas v. Wainwright, 152 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1963) (ultimate decision for allowance or forfeiture of gain time by prisoners had to remain in the Board of Commissioners
of State Institutions and the responsibility for making the final decision could not be
delegated to hearing officer). See also Op. Arr'y GEN. FLA. 063-93 (1963).
164. See, e.g., Deel Motors, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, 252 So. 2d 389 (1st D.C.A.
Fla. 1971) (holding in part that the final order entered in administrative proceedings must
include findings of fact on which the conclusions reached are based).
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rules, recommended penalty, and any other information required by law or
agency rule to be included in the final order. 16 5 Emphasis and consideration
are given to the nature of the hearing officer's recommended report, to prevent the agency from allowing the examiner to completely dispose of the
case. 166 Once the hearing examiner has submitted his complete report, parties
have ten days to submit written exceptions. 167 The agency may then adopt the
recommended order as its final order or it may reject or modify it with respect
to conclusions of law and interpretation of administrative rules. It may not
modify findings of fact, however, unless the agency, upon a review of the entire
record, determines that the findings were not based upon competent substantial evidence or that the proceedings were not conducted in accordance
with law. In addition, the recommended penalty may be accepted or reduced,
but not increased without a review of the entire record. 168
The procedure differes, however, when the hearing is not conducted by a
hearing officer. The agency prepares a proposed order that contains necessary
findings of fact and conclusions of law and is served upon the parties. As under
the old act, the parties are then given an opportunity to file exceptions and
present briefs and oral arguments to those who are to render the decision. 6 9
Once this procedure has been complied with, the final order is to be rendered
within ninety days of either the conclusion of the hearing or the mailing and
submission of the recommended order, or, if there was no hearing, after the
agency has received the written and oral material it authorized to be submitted. The final order is to be in writing and accompanied by findings of fact
7
and conclusions of law.1

0

Upon the rendering of the final order, one last intra-agency route remains
for challenging agency action. 7 1 Section 120.56(1) requires each agency to
provide, by rule, the procedure for filing and disposition of petitions for
declaratory statements as to the applicability of any rule or order of the agency.
Provision for declaratory rulings by agencies is a common feature of administrative procedure legislation. 7 2 Such provision fulfills two important functions:
165. FLA. STAT. §120.57(1)(i) (Supp. 1974).
166. See Nicholas v. Wainwright, 152 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1963); text accompanying note 145
supra.

167.

FLA. STAT.

§120.57(1)(i) (Supp. 1974).

168. FLA. STAT. §120.57(l)(b)(10) (Supp. 1974). This section also provides: "In the event
a court, in revising the agency's order, finds that such agency action was done in bad faith
or maliciously, the court may award attorney's fees and costs to the aggrieved prevailing

party."
169. FLA. STAT. §120.58(1)(d) (Supp. 1974). If the hearing was conducted by a hearing
officer and a majority of those who are to render the final order have not read the entire
record and the agency decision is adverse to anyone but the agency itself, the agency will

also prepare a proposed order. Otherwise, the hearing officer's recommended order serves as
the proposed order.

170. FLA. STAT. §120.59 (Supp. 1974).
171. FLA. STAT. §120.56(1) (Supp. 1974). RMSAPA §8 similarly requires agencies to provide their own rules and procedures for filing these petitions. Furthermore, the declaratory
ruling is subject to judicial review.
172.

See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §5-706 (1973); D.C. CODE ANN. §1-1508 (Supp. 1970); GA.
§3A-112 (1974); HAWAII REv. STAT. §91-8 (1968); IDAHO CODE §67-5208 (1973).

CODE ANN.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol27/iss3/4

20

Mancusi-Ungaro: Rulemaking and Adjudication Under the Florida Administrative Proc
1975]

RULEMAKING

AND ADJUDICATION

it forestalls judicial review by allowing agency action to be corrected at the
agency level, and it gives parties guidance where previously they proceeded at
their own risk.y.3 Under the new Florida procedure, agency disposition of such
petitions constitutes final agency action. 7 4 Failure to utilize this procedure,
however, does not constitute failure to exhaust administrative remedies.175
CONCLUSION

The usual objective of administrative procedure legislation has been to
provide minimum uniform standards in order to allow expeditious execution
of public policy and, at the same time, to protect individuals from arbitrary
agency action.Y6 The 1961 Administrative Procedure Act, 77 fashioned after
the Model State Act, was intended to accomplish such goals. Unfortunately,
courts failed to give effect to its provisions by creating myriad exceptions, and
agencies deviously circumvented its provisions. As a result, a new and much
more comprehensive Administrative Procedure Act was passed by the legislature. 7 8 Whether it closes the loopholes that existed remains to be seen. It is
clear at this juncture, however, that its provisions, if given effect, will check
administrative discretion far more effectively than either the old APA or most
administrative procedure acts elsewhere. In opposition to this approach, many
argue that although the legislature may be in a position to correct deficiencies
that come to its attention, the legislature cannot, by statutory provision, insure
a high caliber of competency in regulatory agencies or instill a sense of responsibility in the minds of administrative officials for effecting fair and
balanced procedure. 7 9 Nevertheless, the Florida experience has been that nice
theories of governmental responsibility do not insure impartial and responsible
exercise of administrative discretion. Apparently, the legislature has chosen
to impose these values to protect the due process rights of its citizens. Administrative practice under the 1974 Administrative Procedure Act will have to
bear the burden of proving whether fair and efficient government can be
achieved in this manner.
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